Lee Anne Fennell is a law-and-economics scholar at the University of Chicago Law School.
Scholarship
Fennell is the author of Revealing Options, published at 118 Harvard Law Review 1399 (2005). The article frames revealing options as a structural problem in property and contract theory: how parties to legal and economic transactions expose their preferences, outside options and reservation prices to one another (Revealing Options — Lee Anne Fennell (118 Harvard Law Review 1399, 2005)).
The article predates most contemporary AI material and has drawn renewed attention as agentic systems reshape who reveals what to whom. It serves as the law-and-economics anchor for choice-architecture analysis, including the Competition and Markets Authority taxonomy discussed in Inside My Advanced Topics Class 7.3: Aristotle's Algorithm (Farahany, March 2026), and is consistent with the empirical pattern reported in Agentic Interactions — Imas, Lee, Misra (2025), where AI-mediated bargaining showed 16.5% higher variance than human-to-human bargaining with prompt content as the only channel for principal heterogeneity. The Coasean transaction-cost lens applied to AI agents in The Coasean Singularity? Demand, Supply, and Market Design with AI Agents — Shahidi, Rusak, Manning, Fradkin, Horton (2025) subsumes the same law-and-economics approach. See Agentic AI.