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Tianjiao Jiang

medium confidence · updated 2026-09-18

Associate professor at Fudan University's Development Institute in Shanghai; Chinese participant in the Brookings–Tsinghua CISS Track II dialogue on AI and national security, who in September 2026 proposed military-AI red lines, mutual acceptance of definitions of 'meaningful human control', and a China-U.S. military hotline for AI incidents.

Tianjiao Jiang (Jiang Tianjiao) is an associate professor at the Development Institute of Fudan University in Shanghai. He is a member of the Chinese delegation to the Track II Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence and National Security convened by the Brookings Institution and Tsinghua University's Center for International Security and Strategy (Advancing human control of military AI (Sisson and Jiang, Brookings, September 2026)). The dialogue is a Brookings–Tsinghua initiative; Jiang's own affiliation is Fudan.

Positions on military AI

In a Brookings commentary of September 9, 2026, published alongside a US perspective by Melanie W. Sisson, Jiang argues that the 2024 US–China consensus on human control of nuclear weapons and the two heads of state's May 2026 proposal for a "constructive strategic stability relationship" "still fall short of preventing AI from spiraling out of control, being misused, or triggering escalations in conflict." He proposes three mechanisms: a list of red lines barring AI from autonomously launching attacks on NC3 systems or autonomously deciding to use nuclear weapons, with a defined list of critical-infrastructure sectors; mutual acceptance of each side's definitions of "meaningful human control," pursued through regular dialogue or a terminology working group, because the two sides "may employ different terminology and adopt divergent approaches"; and a China-U.S. military hotline for "emergency incidents triggered by AI errors or AI cyberattacks," built on the defense-minister hotline and the Maritime Military Security Consultation Mechanism (Advancing human control of military AI (Sisson and Jiang, Brookings, September 2026)).

Jiang identifies three obstacles such mechanisms would still face (the speed of AI-enabled cyber exchanges, the difficulty of attribution, and a security dilemma produced by the opacity of military AI) and argues that bilateral military dialogue should extend to lethal autonomous weapons systems. Given slow progress in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, he proposes that the two countries seek "a minimum common ground on 'prohibiting fully autonomous lethal attacks' and 'ensuring human oversight'" and cooperate against proliferation to nonstate actors (Advancing human control of military AI (Sisson and Jiang, Brookings, September 2026)). Reuters' account of the proposal described it as a shared definition meant to stop both countries using identical language for different levels of autonomy; the commentary frames the problem as divergent terminology (Source: reuters.com). See Autonomous Weapons.

Positions on export controls

Quoted by the New York Times in May 2026 ahead of the Trump–Xi summit, Jiang said that "chip export controls have consistently been an issue China opposes," and that as China's chip-making improves, officials may not want to interfere with efforts to reduce dependence on American technology (Source: nytimes.com). See Export Controls (AI).

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