The set of elements on lethal autonomous weapons systems is a text of twenty paragraphs agreed by consensus by the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). It is contained in paragraphs 25 to 44 of the Group's final report, CCW/GGE.1/2026/3, adopted in Geneva on 4 September 2026 (Report of the 2024–2025–2026 Sessions of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS (CCW/GGE.1/2026/3)). The text characterizes lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), restates the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to them, and sets out measures on human control and judgement, legal review, risk, testing, bias, responsibility and accountability. It is described in the mandate and the report as "a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature": it is not a treaty or protocol, and it creates no legal obligation of its own. The Group recommends that the Convention's Seventh Review Conference "consider and endorse" it.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Document | CCW/GGE.1/2026/3, Report of the 2024-2025-2026 sessions of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (advance copy dated 14 September 2026) |
| Adopted by | CCW Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS, by consensus |
| Adopted | 4 September 2026 (per the report; press accounts place the agreement in the early hours of 5 September) |
| Chair | Ambassador Robert in den Bosch (Netherlands) |
| Legal form | Non-binding "set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature" |
| Next step | Seventh Review Conference of the CCW, 16–20 November 2026 |
Status and timeline
The Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS was established by Decision 1 of the CCW's Fifth Review Conference (CCW/CONF.V/10); Reuters described the 2026 agreement as coming after more than a decade of talks in Geneva (Source: reuters.com). The 2023 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties (CCW/MSP/2023/7, para. 20) directed it to "further consider and formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature, and other possible measures," and to report to the Seventh Review Conference, "preferably before the end of 2025." The Group met for ten days in each of 2024, 2025 and 2026 under Robert in den Bosch, after the Eastern European Group declined its turn to chair (Report of the 2024–2025–2026 Sessions of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS (CCW/GGE.1/2026/3)).
Between sessions the Group maintained a rolling text of formulations on which it had "provisionally found consensus," on the understanding that "nothing has reached consensus until everything has reached consensus"; versions dated 18 December 2025 and 5 June 2026 are published on the UNODA meeting page, followed by draft reports CRP.1 and CRP.1/Rev.1 (dated 3 September) (Source: meetings.unoda.org). The report records adoption on 4 September 2026 of CRP.1/Rev.2 "as orally amended" (para. 46). Reuters reported agreement "overnight into September 5" among the Convention's 128 states parties (Source: reuters.com).
The text's effect depends on the Seventh Review Conference, which the Group asks to endorse the elements "without prejudice to the result of future discussions" and to decide "by consensus on the possible modalities of the future work of the Group" (para. 45). As of late September 2026 the conference had not met.
Scope and characterization
Paragraph 25 characterizes a LAWS, "within the scope of the application of the CCW," as "a combination of one or more weapons and technological components operating together, that is capable of identifying, selecting, and engaging a target in a way that results in loss of life, without intervention by a human being operating the system." A human setting "a set of potential targets or characteristics thereof" does not remove a system from the characterization, but a system is outside it "when the personnel planning, deciding upon, or carrying out the attack determine the specific target or specific group of targets and the timing of the attack" (para. 25(a)). Systems usable in non-lethal ways remain covered (para. 25(b)), and the characterization is open to future modification, exclusion or inclusion of system types (para. 25(c)).
Key provisions
International humanitarian law (paras. 26–33). IHL "applies fully to the development and use of LAWS" (para. 29) and "imposes obligations on States, parties to armed conflict, and individuals, not on machines" (para. 28). LAWS "must not be used" if of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, if inherently indiscriminate, or if "otherwise incapable of being used in accordance with the requirements and principles of IHL" (para. 31); attacks with LAWS must not be directed against civilians or civilian objects (para. 32); and use must accord with distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack (para. 33). The Martens Clause is restated (para. 30).
Control and human judgement (paras. 34–35). "Control and human judgement with regard to LAWS are needed." Humans exercise control "directly or indirectly, including through measures taken before and/or during the use of LAWS," and "regardless of how control is exercised, human beings need to exercise judgement" to determine and implement the measures needed for IHL compliance (para. 34). Relevant measures include a responsible chain of human command and control; limits on scale, target types, duration and geographic scope, "as appropriate"; and measures to intervene, "to the extent possible or feasible, including to deactivate or neutralize LAWS in a timely manner" (para. 35).
Legal review (para. 36). For a new LAWS, "determination must be made whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by international law," with voluntary exchange of practice encouraged.
Risk (para. 37). Civilian-harm risks and precautions "must be considered" through design, development, testing and deployment; other risks, including unintended engagements, "loss of control of the system," proliferation and "acquisition by terrorist groups," "should be considered, as appropriate."
Testing, training and bias (paras. 38–39). States "should" ensure capabilities and limitations are understood through testing and evaluation "including adequately realistic simulations" and through guidance and training, and "should implement measures to prevent and mitigate" unintended bias "in data sets and artificial intelligence models, and other technological components" and automation bias.
Responsibility and accountability (paras. 40–44). Responsibility remains with states, parties and individuals "at all times" across the life cycle (para. 40); states "must take measures to ensure individual accountability ... since accountability cannot be transferred to machines" (para. 41); states "should promote" accountability through understandable human–machine interfaces, rules of engagement and doctrine, and training (para. 42); states "must take measures necessary to prevent and suppress violations" (para. 43); and states "are encouraged" to establish internal mechanisms for addressing incidents that may involve IHL violations (para. 44).
Obligations by actor
The text is addressed to states and, in paragraphs 28 and 40, also to parties to armed conflict and individuals. It imposes nothing on developers or manufacturers. Its verbs mix "must," which in paragraphs 31–33, 36, 41 and 43 restates or applies existing IHL obligations, with "should" and "are encouraged" for the risk, testing, bias, interface and incident-mechanism measures (paras. 37–39, 42, 44). Because the text is a set of elements rather than an instrument, none of these formulations binds a state beyond the underlying law they restate.
Negotiating history
Comparison with the rolling text of 5 June 2026 (Source: docs-library.unoda.org) with the adopted paragraphs (Report of the 2024–2025–2026 Sessions of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS (CCW/GGE.1/2026/3)) shows the following differences. Later drafts (CRP.1, CRP.1/Rev.1) intervened, so the comparison does not establish when each change was made.
| Subject | 5 June 2026 rolling text | Adopted text (CCW/GGE.1/2026/3) |
|---|---|---|
| Characterization | Weapons and "functionally integrated technological components that can identify, select, and engage a target, without intervention by a human operating the system"; exclusion where personnel determine "the specific target or group of targets to be engaged"; human who "designs, programs, or otherwise determines" targets does not exclude | Weapons and "technological components operating together" capable of identifying, selecting and engaging a target "in a way that results in loss of life"; exclusion where personnel determine the specific target or group "and the timing of the attack"; "designs" omitted (para. 25) |
| Weapons prohibited by nature | "It is prohibited in all circumstances to use LAWS which ..." (para. 7) | "LAWS must not be used if ..." (para. 31) |
| Unpredictable effects | "It is prohibited to use LAWS if their effects in attack cannot be anticipated and limited" (para. 8) | No counterpart |
| Production and transfer | States "shall refrain from manufacturing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling, or transferring" non-compliant LAWS (para. 10) | No counterpart |
| Scope of control paragraph | "international law, in particular IHL" (para. 12) | "international law applicable in armed conflict" (para. 34) |
| Form of control | "This does not imply constant direct human control" (para. 12) | "Human beings exercise such control directly or indirectly" (para. 34) |
| Legal assessment and ethics | Chain of command "including ensuring assessment of legal obligations by a human ... as well as taking into account ethical considerations" (para. 12A) | Responsible chain of human command and control; no reference to ethical considerations (para. 35(a)) |
| Limits on operation | Scale, target types, duration, geographic scope "and the number of engagements that LAWS can undertake autonomously" (para. 12B) | Scale, target types, duration and geographic scope, "as appropriate" (para. 35(b)) |
| Changes to mission parameters | Target and mission parameters cannot be substantially modified "unless such modification is executed or authorized by a human" (para. 12C) | No counterpart |
| Deactivation | LAWS "can be deactivated or neutralized in a timely manner" (para. 12D) | Measures to intervene "to the extent possible or feasible, including to deactivate or neutralize" (para. 35(c)) |
| Design and development | Elements "should be taken into account in the design, development, and use of LAWS" (para. 13) | No counterpart |
| Legal review | States "must ... conduct legal reviews" and review modifications with substantial impact on targeting functions (para. 14A–B) | "Determination must be made" for a new LAWS; no provision on modifications (para. 36) |
| Predictability and explainability | LAWS "adequately predictable and reliable," functioning "traceable and explainable" (para. 15C) | No counterpart |
| Bias | Mitigate bias "as much as possible" (paras. 16–17) | "Prevent and mitigate" bias, without "as much as possible"; adds "other technological components" (para. 39) |
| Risk | No counterpart | Civilian-harm risk, unintended engagement, loss of control, proliferation, terrorist acquisition (para. 37) |
| Incident mechanisms | States "must ensure effective internal mechanisms for the investigation, reporting, and appropriate action" (para. 22) | States "are encouraged to ensure" mechanisms "for addressing incidents" (para. 44) |
Human Rights Watch's account of the removals, "references to design and development," the narrowing "from all international law to only international humanitarian law," "the reference to ethical considerations," and references to "predictability, reliability, explainability, and traceability," corresponds to rows in this table (Source: hrw.org).
Reactions
Reuters reported that the United States and Russia, which favour national guidelines over legally binding international rules, opposed stronger language, and that Washington sought flexibility including in areas related to exercising human judgment. Stop Killer Robots executive director Nicole van Rooijen said the definition and the measures to reduce civilian harm appeared weakened, and that the previous three years' work had "been substantially diluted in the last hours" (Source: reuters.com). Human Rights Watch described the final report as "significantly watered down" and named Russia and the United States among states that weakened it, but said it "includes a characterization of lethal autonomous weapons systems, affirms that human control and judgment are required for compliance with international law, and incorporates restrictions on systems that cannot comply with that law," and that it "provides a sufficient foundation for launching negotiations." It counted 76 states supporting negotiations on a legally binding instrument, 70 of them High Contracting Parties, which it described as a majority of the Convention's parties, and called the November Review Conference "a decisive moment" for adopting a negotiating mandate (Source: hrw.org). A Washington Post account of 26 September 2026 described the United States and Russia as having stripped human-oversight safeguards from the text (Source: washingtonpost.com); the adopted paragraphs 34–35 retain a requirement of "control and human judgement," in the form set out above.
Relation to other approaches
The characterization in paragraph 25 is close to the definition of an autonomous weapon system in US DoD Directive 3000.09 (a system that, once activated, selects and engages targets without further human intervention). The directive's design standard is "appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force"; the elements combine "control" and "human judgement" and allow control to be exercised "directly or indirectly." The ICRC's position calls for a legally binding instrument prohibiting unpredictable and anti-personnel autonomous weapons and strictly regulating others; the adopted elements contain no category prohibition beyond restating IHL's existing rules, and the June rolling text's prohibition on LAWS whose effects "cannot be anticipated and limited," the nearest counterpart to the ICRC's unpredictability prohibition, does not appear in the adopted text.
Relationships
- instance-of: Autonomous Weapons — the multilateral CCW track on LAWS
- depends-on: Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) — the framework convention and its Review Conference
- supports: Report of the 2024–2025–2026 Sessions of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS (CCW/GGE.1/2026/3) — the report containing the text
- related: CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Robert in den Bosch, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)
- contradicts: ICRC Position on Autonomous Weapon Systems (source summary) — the ICRC sought category prohibitions in a binding instrument; the elements are non-binding and contain none beyond existing IHL
- related: DoD Directive 3000.09 — Autonomy in Weapon Systems — US national policy with a similar autonomy definition and an "appropriate levels of human judgment" standard
- related: Human Rights Watch, Stop Killer Robots, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) — civil-society and IHL commentators