The Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018 (FASCSA) is a U.S. federal statute that authorizes agencies to take "covered procurement action[s]" to prevent their use of information technologies that pose a risk to national security, codified in relevant part at 41 U.S.C. § 4713 with judicial review at 41 U.S.C. § 1327. It is one of two statutory authorities the Department of War used in 2026 to exclude Anthropic's Claude from its supply chain; the D.C. Circuit upheld the § 4713 exclusion on September 25, 2026 in a 2–1 decision that turned on the breadth of the statute's definition of "supply chain risk" (Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War — D.C. Circuit Opinion, Nos. 26-1049 and 26-1162 (September 25, 2026)).
Key provisions
The provisions below are as described and quoted in the D.C. Circuit's opinion (Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War — D.C. Circuit Opinion, Nos. 26-1049 and 26-1162 (September 25, 2026)).
Covered procurement actions. Section 4713(a) authorizes covered procurement actions, which include barring agency contracts with a particular supplier and subcontracts that use the supplier to perform work for the agency (§ 4713(k)(4)(A), (B), (D)).
Written determination. Before acting, the agency head must determine in writing that use of the authority "is necessary to protect national security by reducing supply chain risk" and that "less intrusive measures are not reasonably available" to reduce that risk, and must specify the class of covered procurement actions the determination authorizes (§ 4713(b)(3)(A)–(C)). The dissent in the Anthropic case also cites a requirement that the risk found be "significant" (§ 4713(b)(1)).
Notice and urgency exception. The supplier must receive notice and an opportunity to respond before the determination (§ 4713(b)(2)). The agency head may "temporarily delay" notice on determining that "an urgent national security interest requires the immediate exercise of the authority," in which case notice and an opportunity to respond must follow "as soon as practicable after addressing the urgent national security interest" (§ 4713(c)).
Definition of supply chain risk. Section 4713(k)(6) defines the term as "the risk that any person may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, extract data, or otherwise manipulate the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, maintenance, disposition, or retirement of covered articles so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise manipulate the function, use, or operation of the covered articles or information stored or transmitted on the covered articles."
Judicial review. A party notified of a covered procurement action may petition the D.C. Circuit within 60 days of notification (41 U.S.C. § 1327(b)(1)); other judicial review of any "action taken under" § 4713 is barred (§ 1327(a)). The court must "hold unlawful" covered procurement actions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" or "not in accord with procedures required by law" (§ 1327(b)(2)), standards the D.C. Circuit describes as closely tracking the Administrative Procedure Act.
Comparison with 10 U.S.C. § 3252
The Department of War's parallel designation of Anthropic rested on 10 U.S.C. § 3252, which defines supply chain risk as "the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system" (§ 3252(d)(4)).
| Element | 41 U.S.C. § 4713(k)(6) | 10 U.S.C. § 3252(d)(4) |
|---|---|---|
| Actor | "any person" | "an adversary" |
| Residual verb (first string) | "otherwise manipulate" | "otherwise subvert" |
| Additional listed act | "extract data" | none |
| Residual verb (second string) | "otherwise manipulate" | "otherwise degrade" |
| Review forum | D.C. Circuit, exclusive (§ 1327) | District court under the APA, as in the Anthropic case |
The Northern District of California read § 3252 as "directed at covert acts or hacks, not overt, public positions regarding contract terms," noting that Congress enacted it in 2010 and that the Department's 2012 implementing instructions described the risk as "sabotage or subversion" by "foreign intelligence, terrorists, or other hostile elements," and vacated the Anthropic designation (Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War — Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment (N.D. Cal., August 27, 2026)). The D.C. Circuit majority stated it had "no quarrel" with that reading of § 3252 but held that § 4713 is "much broader" and requires no bad motive (Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War — D.C. Circuit Opinion, Nos. 26-1049 and 26-1162 (September 25, 2026)).
Judicial interpretation
In Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War, Nos. 26-1049 and 26-1162 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2026), the majority (Katsas, J., joined by Rao, J.) held that "manipulate" carries its ordinary meaning of "[t]o move, arrange, operate, or control," so that a supplier that trains restrictions into a model to deny it particular functions manipulates its design or operation; "the statutory definition of a 'supply chain risk' turns on what Anthropic does, not why Anthropic does it." It rejected narrowing the definition by the associated-words, ejusdem generis and series-qualifier canons, by an implied requirement of surreptitious action, or by legislative history focused on foreign companies, reasoning that "any person" cannot refer only to foreign entities and that ambiguities in national-security procurement statutes are construed in the government's favor. It also held that the prejudicial-error rule applies to review under § 1327, so that a failure to give advance notice is harmless once post-exclusion process has been provided and has failed to change the decision (Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War — D.C. Circuit Opinion, Nos. 26-1049 and 26-1162 (September 25, 2026)).
Judge Henderson, dissenting, would have read "otherwise manipulate" as limited to intentionally subversive or deceptive acts. She cited the Senate report on the Act, S. Rep. No. 115-408 (2018), as describing legislation to meet the threat of "[h]ostile nation state and other bad actors" infiltrating federal information systems through supply chains, and warned that under the majority's reading a contractor enforcing use restrictions the Department disfavors could face designation as a national security threat (Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War — D.C. Circuit Opinion, Nos. 26-1049 and 26-1162 (September 25, 2026)).
Relationships
- related: Anthropic v. United States (Pentagon ban challenge) — the Department of War's 2026 exclusion of Anthropic under § 4713
- depends-on: Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War — D.C. Circuit Opinion, Nos. 26-1049 and 26-1162 (September 25, 2026), Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War — Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment (N.D. Cal., August 27, 2026)
- related: Government AI Procurement, Procurement-Driven AI Governance, DOD — Department of Defense (AI Deployer), Pete Hegseth
- related: ICTS Supply Chain Security Act — a separate 2026 Senate bill on Commerce Department ICTS authority, not an amendment of this Act