The Securing Enforcement of Americans' Right to Competition at Home (SEARCH) Act of 2026 is a bipartisan United States Senate bill introduced on July 17, 2026 by Senators Eric Schmitt (R-MO) and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), aimed at search-market competition (Source: schmitt.senate.gov). The text released by Klobuchar's office lists her as introducing it "for herself and Mr. Schmitt"; that version carries no bill number (Source: klobuchar.senate.gov). The sponsors describe it as putting into law the remedies that Schmitt, as Missouri Attorney General, and the Justice Department sought in the Google search monopolization case (United States v. Google (Search)) (Source: schmitt.senate.gov).
Scope and definitions
The bill applies to a covered platform: an entity that offers a general search engine, AI search, or search ads in the United States; offers its search engine or AI search through a platform, device, browser or operating system it does not exclusively own or control; and, in any period during the preceding 12 months, has US monthly active users on that channel equal to at least 40 percent of the US population over age 12. AI search is defined as a general search engine that uses generative AI together with a search index to generate responses to a query or prompt. A qualified competitor, the beneficiary of the data-sharing and syndication duties, is a competitor offering or intending to offer a general search engine, AI search, or search-ad product with a valuation greater than one-third of the Hart-Scott-Rodino size-of-transaction threshold (Source: klobuchar.senate.gov).
Key provisions
The sponsors' announcement states that the bill would bar dominant search engines from paying distributors to make them users' default choice, require search engines to share data and search results with competitors, and require access points to offer users alternative search tools (Source: schmitt.senate.gov). The bill text sets these out as follows (Source: klobuchar.senate.gov):
- Exclusionary conduct (§ 3). A covered platform may not pay distributors, device makers or browser developers for preferential treatment, default status or pre-installation of its search engine, AI search or search access point; may not enter or enforce exclusive or most-favoured-nation agreements with publishers or distributors; may not condition access to app stores or operating systems on distribution of its search products; and may not tie revenue sharing to default status. It must obtain prior written approval from the Federal Trade Commission for any acquisition, investment or joint venture involving a search, AI-search or search-ads competitor that exceeds the HSR size-of-transaction threshold or, regardless of value, would confer control or material influence or exclusive access to a competitor's computational resources, training data, search index or distribution, and must give state attorneys general 60 days' notice before closing.
- Self-preferencing (§ 4). A covered platform may not use its control of search, AI search or search ads, or its ownership of browsers, operating systems or devices, to advantage its own products, including through placement, exclusive access to data, degradation of competitors, or interface design.
- Data sharing (§ 5). Covered platforms must give qualified competitors non-discriminatory access to their search index and ranking signals, user-side data and ads data, at marginal cost through an API updated at least weekly, with personally identifying information filtered out and recipients contractually barred from re-identification. A platform may not condition a publisher's inclusion in search indexing on consent to use of its content for other services, including the training of generative AI products.
- Mandatory syndication (§ 6). Covered platforms must license search results, ranking signals and related features, including local, maps, video, image and knowledge-panel content, to qualified competitors at marginal cost, with access guaranteed for at least 10 years, and must license search-ad inventory on a non-discriminatory basis for renewable one-year periods.
- Advertiser transparency (§ 7) and user choice (§ 8). Advertisers receive query-level reporting and real-time data export. Users must be shown a neutral choice screen at device setup, browser installation or account creation and at least annually; covered platforms may not preinstall their own search engine as the default on new devices; and the FTC may require contributions of up to 0.05 percent of US annual revenue to fund user education on search choice.
- Enforcement (§ 9). The FTC, the Attorney General or any state attorney general may enforce the Act by civil action. Covered platforms must file an annual compliance certification by March 31, appoint a compliance officer, and give specified executives and legal staff at least 10 hours of in-person antitrust and evidence-preservation training a year, with a personal penalty of up to 10 percent of annual compensation for failing to complete it. Violations carry a civil penalty of up to 15 percent of the platform's US annual revenue.
- Remedies, timing and sunset (§§ 10, 15). Section 10 directs that remedies for Sherman Act § 2 violations terminate the monopoly and deny the defendant the fruits of the violation. Sections 3 and 4 take effect 90 days after enactment and sections 5 through 8 one year after; the Act sunsets 10 years after enactment unless extended.
Reactions
The sponsors' announcement carried statements of support from DuckDuckGo founder and chief executive Gabriel Weinberg, Digital Progress Institute president Joel Thayer, Bull Moose Project founder Aiden Buzzetti, and Public Knowledge senior policy advocate Patrick Gallaher (Source: schmitt.senate.gov).
Satya Marar, a research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, criticized the bill on July 22, 2026 on Truth on the Market, the blog of the International Center for Law & Economics, as importing the approach of the EU Digital Markets Act and, in his view, its mistakes (Source: truthonthemarket.com). Marar argues that the section 3 ban on default payments would remove a revenue source that funds independent browsers such as Mozilla Firefox; that the marginal-cost data-sharing requirements of sections 5 and 6 create a free-rider problem and privacy risk; and that the section 3(e) pre-approval requirement would bring AI search within the regime and slow investment in AI competitors. He contrasts the bill with Judge Amit Mehta's remedy in the Google search case, which required Google to offer certain data to competitors on "commercial terms" rather than at marginal cost (Source: truthonthemarket.com).
Relationships
- related: Digital Markets Act (EU) — the EU regime critics compare it to.
- related: United States v. Google (Search) — the antitrust case addressing the same default-placement conduct.
- related: Google DeepMind — principal covered platform.
- related: Amy Klobuchar — lead sponsor on the released text.
- related: AI Antitrust — the bill's AI-search definitions and FTC pre-approval of AI-competitor deals bring AI search within ex ante competition rules.