AI Policy Wiki
Dashboard
⚲
AI Policy Wiki › Source Summaries

Report of the 2024–2025–2026 Sessions of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS (CCW/GGE.1/2026/3)

high confidence · updated 2026-09-27

Source summary for the consensus final report of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems, adopted 4 September 2026: a characterization of LAWS and a 'set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature' (paras. 25–44), recommended to the Seventh Review Conference for endorsement.

Contents

Report of the 2024-2025-2026 sessions of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (document CCW/GGE.1/2026/3) is the final report of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on lethal autonomous weapons systems established under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The Group adopted it by consensus in Geneva on 4 September 2026 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Robert in den Bosch of the Netherlands. Its operative content is a characterization of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) and a "set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature" (paragraphs 25 to 44), which the Group recommends that the Convention's Seventh Review Conference, scheduled for 16–20 November 2026, "consider and endorse." The text is analysed as an instrument on CCW GGE Set of Elements on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (2026).

Provenance

The document summarized here is the advance copy dated 14 September 2026, which carries the note "The present document is being issued without formal editing." It is 10 pages long and was published in the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) document library and linked from the official meeting page for the Group's 2026 sessions. As of 27 September 2026 the meeting page listed no formally edited version. Paragraph numbers cited on this page are those of the advance copy. The report states (para. 46) that the Group adopted it "as contained in CCW/GGE.1/2026/CRP.1/Rev.2, as orally amended," so statements delivered by delegations at adoption may cite paragraph numbers that differ from the issued text.

The report dates adoption to 4 September 2026 (para. 46) and records the second 2026 session as closing on Friday, 4 September (para. 11). Reuters reported that states reached agreement "overnight into September 5" (Source: reuters.com), and Human Rights Watch placed the conclusion "in the early hours of September 5" (Source: hrw.org). The accounts are consistent with a meeting of 4 September that ran past midnight; the report's own date is 4 September.

Mandate and organization of work

The Group worked under the mandate given by the 2023 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties (CCW/MSP/2023/7, para. 20): to "further consider and formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature, and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems," taking into account the example of the Convention's existing Protocols, proposals by High Contracting Parties, and other options, and to submit a report to the Seventh Review Conference. The Group itself dated back to Decision 1 of the Fifth Review Conference (CCW/CONF.V/10). The 2023 mandate asked the Group to finish "preferably before the end of 2025" and to meet for 10 days a year (para. 1).

The Eastern European Group, whose turn it was to chair, declined, and the High Contracting Parties endorsed Robert in den Bosch, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament, nominated by the Western European and Others Group, through a written silence procedure (para. 2). The Group met for 10 days in each of 2024 (4–8 March, 26–30 August), 2025 (3–7 March, 1–5 September) and 2026 (2–6 March, 31 August–4 September), with informal meetings between sessions (paras. 3–5). High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu delivered video statements at the opening sessions (paras. 6, 8, 10, 11).

Participants listed in the report are 102 High Contracting Parties, including China, France, India, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States; two signatory states (Egypt and Nigeria); 15 non-party observer states, including Iran; the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research; more than 50 non-governmental organizations, among them Amnesty International, Article 36, the Future of Life Institute, Human Rights Watch, the International Committee for Robot Arms Control and Stop Killer Robots; and more than 20 universities and research institutes, including the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the University of Cambridge (paras. 13–18). Annex I lists the working papers submitted, including papers from the United States (CCW/GGE.1/2025/WP.6), the Russian Federation (CCW/GGE.1/2024/WP.2), India, Pakistan, Brazil, Japan, Egypt, Türkiye, joint papers by European states and by a group of states including Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States, and a 2026 working paper by the ICRC (CCW/GGE.1/2026/WP.4).

Characterization of LAWS (para. 25)

Paragraph 25 characterizes a lethal autonomous weapon system, "within the scope of the application of the CCW," as "a combination of one or more weapons and technological components operating together, that is capable of identifying, selecting, and engaging a target in a way that results in loss of life, without intervention by a human being operating the system." Three qualifications follow:

  • (a) A human programming or otherwise determining "a set of potential targets or characteristics thereof" does not take a system out of the characterization. A system is excluded "when the personnel planning, deciding upon, or carrying out the attack determine the specific target or specific group of targets and the timing of the attack."
  • (b) A LAWS that can be used in a way that does not cause loss of life, for example to damage objects or cause injury, is not thereby excluded.
  • (c) The characterization is "without prejudice to any future understanding and the potential modification of this characterization, as well as the exclusion or inclusion of certain types of systems."

International humanitarian law (paras. 26–33)

The report restates that the right of parties to a conflict to choose methods or means of warfare "is not unlimited" (para. 26); that international humanitarian law (IHL) governs all weapons "of the past, those of the present, and those of the future, including those incorporating emerging technologies in the area of LAWS" (para. 27); that IHL "imposes obligations on States, parties to armed conflict, and individuals, not on machines" (para. 28); and that IHL "applies fully to the development and use of LAWS" (para. 29). Paragraph 30 restates the Martens Clause. Paragraph 31 provides that LAWS "must not be used if they are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or if they are inherently indiscriminate, or are otherwise incapable of being used in accordance with the requirements and principles of IHL." Paragraphs 32 and 33 bar attacks using LAWS directed against the civilian population, civilian objects and protected civilians, and require use only "in accordance with international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack."

Control and human judgement (paras. 34–35)

Paragraph 34 states that "control and human judgement with regard to LAWS are needed" to uphold compliance with the law of armed conflict. It continues: "Human beings exercise such control directly or indirectly, including through measures taken before and/or during the use of LAWS. Regardless of how control is exercised, human beings need to exercise judgement to determine those measures necessary to ensure compliance with applicable IHL." The factors to be considered include "the operational context and the characteristics and capabilities of the weapon system." Paragraph 35 lists relevant measures "inter alia": operation under "a responsible chain of human command and control"; "limiting the scale of the operation, types of targets, duration, and geographical scope, as appropriate"; and "measures to intervene in the operation of LAWS, to the extent possible or feasible, including to deactivate or neutralize LAWS in a timely manner."

  • Legal review (para. 36). In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new LAWS, "determination must be made whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by international law." Voluntary exchange of practice between states is encouraged, "bearing in mind national security considerations and commercial restrictions on proprietary information."
  • Risk (para. 37). During design, development, testing and deployment, the risk of civilian casualties and precautions to minimize incidental harm "must be considered." Other risks "should be considered, as appropriate, including but not limited to the risk of unintended engagements, risk of loss of control of the system, risk of proliferation, and risk of acquisition by terrorist groups."
  • Understanding capabilities and limitations (para. 38). States "should ensure" that the capabilities and limitations of LAWS can be understood by conducting testing and evaluation, "including adequately realistic simulations," and by providing guidance, training and instructions to personnel in the chain of command.
  • Bias (para. 39). States "should implement measures to prevent and mitigate" unintended bias "in data sets and artificial intelligence models, and other technological components," and automation bias in the use of LAWS.

Responsibility and accountability (paras. 40–44)

States, parties to armed conflict and individuals "remain at all times responsible under applicable international law for their decisions with regard to the use of LAWS," across the weapon's life cycle (para. 40). States "must take measures to ensure individual accountability for the use of LAWS," including through a responsible chain of human command and control, "since accountability cannot be transferred to machines" (para. 41). States "should promote" responsibility and accountability and may do so through understandable human–machine interfaces, guidance and instructions such as rules of engagement and doctrine, and training (para. 42). States "must take measures necessary to prevent and suppress violations" relating to use of LAWS under their jurisdiction (para. 43), and "are encouraged to ensure that effective internal mechanisms for addressing incidents involving their use of LAWS, that may involve violations of applicable IHL, are established" (para. 44).

Recommendations (para. 45)

The Group recommends that the High Contracting Parties at the Seventh Review Conference, to be held on 16–20 November 2026, "consider and endorse the set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature, and other possible measures ... as contained in paragraphs 25 to 44 ... without prejudice to the result of future discussions," and that the Review Conference "decides by consensus on the possible modalities of the future work of the Group." The report does not itself recommend negotiations on a legally binding instrument, and does not state what form an instrument would take.

Changes from the June 2026 rolling text

A comparison with the Group's rolling text of 5 June 2026, which recorded formulations on which the Group had "provisionally found consensus" on the understanding that "nothing has reached consensus until everything has reached consensus," shows the adopted text omitting or softening several provisions (Source: docs-library.unoda.org). The comparison is with the June text only; the Group also worked from later drafts (CRP.1 and CRP.1/Rev.1, both listed on the meeting page), and the stage at which each change was made is not recorded in the report. The paragraph-by-paragraph comparison is on CCW GGE Set of Elements on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (2026). In summary, the June text's prohibitions phrased as "It is prohibited" became "must not be used"; provisions on LAWS whose effects "cannot be anticipated and limited," on refraining from manufacturing, acquiring, stockpiling or transferring non-compliant LAWS, on human authorization of changes to target and mission parameters, on review of modifications, on taking the elements into account in design and development, on assessment of legal obligations by a human "taking into account ethical considerations," and on predictability, reliability, traceability and explainability have no counterpart in the adopted text; the scope of the control paragraph moved from "international law, in particular IHL" to "international law applicable in armed conflict"; and the obligation that states "must ensure" internal incident mechanisms became an encouragement. The adopted text adds the risk paragraph (para. 37), which has no counterpart in the June text.

Human Rights Watch's 7 September 2026 account of what the final version removed, "references to design and development," the scope narrowed "from all international law to only international humanitarian law," "the reference to ethical considerations," and references to "predictability, reliability, explainability, and traceability," matches these differences (Source: hrw.org).

Reception

Stop Killer Robots executive director Nicole van Rooijen said the definition and the civilian-harm measures appeared weakened, and that work of the previous three years had "been substantially diluted in the last hours." Reuters reported that the United States and Russia, which favour national guidelines over legally binding international rules, opposed stronger language, with Washington seeking flexibility including on exercising human judgment (Source: reuters.com). Human Rights Watch called the report "significantly watered down" and named Russia and the United States among states that weakened it, while stating that it "includes a characterization of lethal autonomous weapons systems, affirms that human control and judgment are required for compliance with international law, and incorporates restrictions on systems that cannot comply with that law," and that it "provides a sufficient foundation for launching negotiations." HRW, citing Stop Killer Robots, counted 76 states supporting a move to negotiations on a legally binding instrument, 70 of them High Contracting Parties (Source: hrw.org).

Key claims

  • The Group formulated, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument "without prejudging its nature" (para. 23). (Confidence: high; primary text.)
  • The characterization of LAWS turns on identifying, selecting and engaging a target "without intervention by a human being operating the system," and excludes systems where personnel determine the specific target or group of targets and the timing of the attack (para. 25). (Confidence: high.)
  • Control and human judgement "are needed," exercised "directly or indirectly" (para. 34). (Confidence: high.)
  • Accountability "cannot be transferred to machines" (para. 41). (Confidence: high.)
  • Endorsement is left to the Seventh Review Conference, 16–20 November 2026 (para. 45). (Confidence: high as to the recommendation; the outcome is not yet known.)

Relationships

Categories: Source Summaries | global | international-org | legislation | framework | autonomous-weapons | laws | ccw | ihl | national-security | safety
What links here (13)