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On the Biology of a Large Language Model

medium confidence · updated 2026-09-22

Anthropic's 2025 interpretability paper applying circuit tracing to Claude 3.5 Haiku across ten case studies — multi-step reasoning, poetry planning, multilingual circuits, arithmetic, medical diagnosis, hallucination, refusal, jailbreaks, chain-of-thought faithfulness and a model with a hidden goal.

"On the Biology of a Large Language Model" is a 2025 interpretability paper from Anthropic's Transformer Circuits team, published on transformer-circuits.pub. It applies circuit tracing — a set of tools for mapping the internal computational graphs of language models, introduced in a companion methods paper published alongside it — to Claude 3.5 Haiku, Anthropic's lightweight production model. The paper draws an explicit analogy to biology: living organisms are complex systems sculpted by billions of years of evolution whose basic principles are simple but whose mechanisms are intricate, and the authors argue that language models, though generated by simple human-designed training algorithms, present the same problem. Attribution graphs are presented as the equivalent of a microscope, enabling feature-level understanding of a model the way microscopy enabled cell-level understanding of organisms.

The paper is credited to Lindsey et al. Its BibTeX author list runs: Jack Lindsey, Wes Gurnee, Emmanuel Ameisen, Brian Chen, Adam Pearce, Nicholas L. Turner, Craig Citro, David Abrahams, Shan Carter, Basil Hosmer, Jonathan Marcus, Michael Sklar, Adly Templeton, Trenton Bricken, Callum McDougall, Hoagy Cunningham, Thomas Henighan, Adam Jermyn, Andy Jones, Andrew Persic, Zhenyi Qi, T. Ben Thompson, Sam Zimmerman, Kelley Rivoire, Thomas Conerly, Chris Olah and Joshua Batson. See Mechanistic Interpretability.

Methodology

The method centers on attribution graphs. It builds on sparse autoencoders and transcoders — specifically cross-layer transcoders (CLTs) — to identify interpretable "features," described as the model's basic units of computation, and maps connections between features to produce wiring diagrams the authors compare to neuroscience connectomics. The approach generates hypotheses about internal mechanisms and then tests them through perturbation experiments: inhibiting or substituting a feature and observing whether the output changes as the hypothesized mechanism predicts.

The models studied are transformer-based, composed of MLP layers that process information within each token position and attention layers that move information between positions. The authors state that one reason models are difficult to interpret is that neurons are typically polysemantic, performing many seemingly unrelated functions; replacing MLP computation with transcoder features is the step intended to recover an interpretable basis. Earlier work in the same program is summarized at Scaling Monosemanticity: Extracting Interpretable Features from Claude 3 Sonnet.

The paper is explicit that the method's yield is partial: the authors report that attribution graphs provide "satisfying insight for about a quarter of the prompts we've tried," and describe the highlighted examples as success cases. They characterize the case studies as existence proofs — "concrete evidence that specific mechanisms operate in certain contexts" — while stating that they cannot guarantee similar mechanisms operate beyond them, and that the cases chosen are undoubtedly unrepresentative of the whole. The authors position the qualitative investigations as the best judge of the method's value, "just as the usefulness of a microscope is ultimately determined by the scientific discoveries it enables," and describe AI interpretability as "a pre-paradigmatic field still in search of its foundations." A systematic evaluation is deferred to the companion methods paper.

Case studies

The paper presents a series of case studies in which attribution graphs reveal internal mechanisms. The authors note they can be read in any order.

  • Multi-step reasoning. The model represents intermediate concepts internally, for example identifying "Texas" as an internal step when asked about "the capital of the state containing Dallas." Intervention experiments replacing the intermediate representation change the output to a different state capital, which the authors treat as evidence the step is causal rather than incidental.
  • Planning in poems. Before writing each line, the model identifies potential rhyming words at the end and then constructs the line to reach them. Asked for a line rhyming with "grab it," the model activates "rabbit" and "habit" features on the newline token before the line begins. Inhibiting the preferred plan causes the model to rewrite the line so that it naturally ends on the alternative. Further steering experiments test whether the planning features shape the whole sentence structure rather than only the final word.
  • Multilingual circuits. The model uses a mixture of language-specific and abstract, language-independent circuits. Intervention experiments swap the operation (from an antonym to a synonym task), the operand (from "small" to "hot") and the language independently, and the authors report that the crux of the computation is consistently language-agnostic. They report that language-agnostic representations are more prevalent in Claude 3.5 Haiku than in a smaller, less capable model, and relate the finding to a standing tension in the multilingual-interpretability literature over whether models operate in a shared conceptual space or in a privileged language.
  • Arithmetic. Building on the companion paper's analysis of how the model adds, the paper examines whether addition features generalize beyond "raw" problems of the form "a + b =" to the broader contexts in which arithmetic appears.
  • Medical diagnosis. The model identifies candidate diagnoses from symptoms and uses them to inform follow-up questions, all internally, without writing intermediate steps.
  • Hallucination. Circuits distinguish familiar from unfamiliar entities, and misfires cause hallucinations. The authors contrast a base-model continuation — the prompt "Michael Batkin plays the sport of" completed with "Pickleball" — against the finetuned Assistant's refusal to state a sport for the same invented name, and argue that hallucination is the natural behavior that finetuning mitigates, so the circuits worth looking for are the ones that prevent it. The analysis finds positive connections directly from "Assistant" features to "can't answer the question" features, which the authors read as the model defaulting to an assumption that it cannot answer, with recognized entities inhibiting that default.
  • Refusal of harmful requests. The model constructs a general-purpose "harmful requests" feature during finetuning, aggregated from specific harmful-request features learned during pretraining. The section begins from a refusal requiring a simple inference and then intervenes to circumvent it.
  • Jailbreak analysis. The paper analyzes one jailbreak partially effective on Claude 3.5 Haiku, in which the model is asked to assemble the first letters of "Babies Outlive Mustard Block" and explain how to make the resulting word. The model begins complying before cutting itself off and refusing. The authors attribute the partial success to the model being tricked into starting the instructions, after which syntactic and grammatical pressure to complete the sentence carries it forward. See Jailbreaking and Red Teaming.
  • Chain-of-thought faithfulness. The method distinguishes genuine reasoning, fabricated reasoning, and backward reasoning derived from a human-provided clue. Inhibition experiments on the key feature clusters test the unfaithful backward-reasoning case, and the authors report that the circuit mechanisms predict the model's susceptibility to the bias. They describe the result as a proof of concept that the methods can sometimes identify when a chain of thought misrepresents the model's actual computation.
  • Hidden goal detection. Applied to a model finetuned with a secret goal — appeasing known biases in reward models — the interpretability methods identify mechanisms pursuing the goal. The reward-model-bias features are found to activate not only in relevant contexts but in any dialogue formatted as a Human/Assistant conversation, receiving direct input from the Human/Assistant features themselves. The case study builds on a model organism developed by Sam Marks and Johannes Treutlein. See Reward Hacking.

Structural observations across graphs

The paper collects general observations about attribution-graph structure that recur across the case studies:

  • Input, abstract, and output features. Paths typically begin with input features representing tokens or low-level input properties and end with output features that promote or suppress particular output tokens, with more abstract features in the middle — broadly consistent with a detokenization, abstraction, retokenization progression.
  • Convergent paths and shortcuts. A source node often influences a target through several paths of different lengths, a pattern the authors identify with the coherent feedforward loop described in systems biology.
  • Features smeared across token positions. The same feature is often active across nearby positions with similar input and output edges, which the authors suggest maintains consistent representations.
  • Long-range connections. Features in one layer can have direct output edges to any downstream layer; cross-layer transcoders make such layer-skipping edges more prominent than single-layer transcoders would.
  • A special role for special tokens. Important information is stored on newline tokens, periods and other delimiters — as in the poetry case, where candidate rhyme words sit on the newline preceding the line. The authors relate this to prior findings that sentiment information rides on comma tokens and temporal information on period tokens.
  • Default circuits. Some circuits appear active by default in a given context, such as the hallucination case's direct Assistant-to-"can't answer" connection.
  • Attention often does its work early. Pruned graphs often show nodes across all layers at the final token position but only early-layer nodes at earlier positions.
  • Context-dependent roles of multifaceted features. Features frequently represent specific conjunctions of concepts, which the authors elsewhere treat as the undesirable side of feature splitting.
  • Confidence-reduction features. Late-layer features that activate immediately before a token while carrying strong negative output weight to it recur across examples; the authors connect them to prior work on confidence-regulation neurons.
  • "Boring" circuits. A large fraction of active features and edges on any prompt fulfill basic, obvious roles rather than the crux of the behavior.

Limitations

The authors separate limitations of the case studies from limitations of the method. On the case studies, they state that the results are claims about specific examples and not about mechanisms more broadly, and that additional mechanisms they cannot see are likely present.

On the method, they list the cases where it fails to provide insight: reasoning that cannot be reduced to a single crux token, since a graph is produced for one output token at a time; prompts longer than roughly a hundred tokens, an engineering limit compounded by graph complexity; long internal reasoning chains, where tracing errors compound; unusual prompts involving obscure entities or obfuscated language, where the transcoders have not learned the relevant features and the graph is dominated by error nodes; questions of the form "why does the model not do X?", because inactive features are not surfaced by default; and completions that copy an earlier word, where the graph shows only a direct edge.

Underlying methodological issues named include missing attention circuits, since the method does not explain how attention patterns are computed; reconstruction errors and "dark matter," meaning the fraction of computation left unexplained and manifesting as uninterpretable error nodes; the unsurfaced role of inactive features and inhibitory circuits, which the hallucination case study shows can be the interesting part; graph complexity, with the published graphs heavily pruned and pre-labeled; features landing at the wrong level of abstraction through feature splitting; the difficulty of moving from prompt-specific graphs to global circuits; and mechanistic faithfulness, since transcoders are not guaranteed to learn a causally faithful model of the original MLP and may reproduce outputs through different mechanisms.

Conclusions the authors draw

The concluding discussion names several properties the case studies are said to demonstrate:

  • Parallel mechanisms and modularity. Graphs commonly contain qualitatively different mechanisms running in parallel, sometimes cooperating and sometimes competing — as in the jailbreak, where compliance and refusal circuits compete.
  • Abstraction. The model employs general abstractions spanning domains; the multilingual results suggest concepts are translated into a shared representation in intermediate activations, and the greater prevalence of language-agnostic representations in the larger model is taken to link such generality to capability.
  • Plan formation. The poetry case is described as an instance of the model forming internally generated plans for future output, with the authors noting that the model is not simply predicting the next token.
  • Working backward from a goal. The authors report backward chaining in two places: rhyme-word features causally influencing tokens produced before the rhyme word, and the unfaithful chain-of-thought case.
  • Metacognition, or the lack of it. Features representing knowing the answer and being unable to answer are activated and inhibited by features for particular famous entities; intervening on them can make the model act as though it knows an answer it does not.
  • Ingrained characteristics. The reward-model-bias features activating in every Human/Assistant dialogue is presented as a finding that surprised the authors, most plausibly forged during finetuning because tying the goal to the Assistant persona was the simplest available mechanism.
  • Complexity. The authors describe this as their most consistent finding: the mechanisms behind even simple responses can only be faithfully described by an overwhelmingly large causal graph, and "there is almost always more to the mechanism than the narratives we use to describe it."

The discussion also sets out the research philosophy behind the work — the value of bottom-up investigation that avoids strong top-down assumptions about the hypothesis space, on the grounds that networks are trained with little supervision over their internal structure — and closes on the view that progress in AI is producing a new kind of intelligence, resembling human intelligence in some ways and alien in others, whose nature is worth understanding on its own terms.

Relationships

Provenance

Published on transformer-circuits.pub, Anthropic's interpretability publication venue, at transformer-circuits.pub, in 2025. Held here as Raw Sources/On the Biology of a Large Language Model.md. The paper has a companion methods paper at the same venue, which carries the systematic evaluation of the technique and the detailed treatment of its limitations.