S. 5105 is a bill of the 119th Congress introduced in the Senate on July 23, 2026 by Sen. Adam Schiff (D-California) "for himself and Mr. Banks," read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Its long title is "To establish the applicability of antitrust laws to the sharing of artificial intelligence frontier model risks, and for other purposes." The bill has four sections. It creates an exemption from the antitrust laws for two kinds of conduct among non-Federal entities: sharing information or assistance about defined AI security risks, and coordinating to delay or limit AI release and development to reduce those risks. This page summarizes the Introduced-in-Senate text, the only version of the bill (Source: congress.gov). The topic page is Collaboration on Adversarial Threats and Security Risks Act (S. 5105).
Section 2: definitions
The bill defines most of its terms by incorporation rather than on its face.
- Antitrust laws and non-Federal entity take the meanings in section 102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501). A rule of construction at 2(1)(B) provides that the laws described in section 102(2) of that Act "are consistent to the extent they do not conflict."
- Artificial intelligence takes the meaning in section 238(g) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 4001 note).
- Covered nation, used within the risk definition, is not defined in the bill; it is incorporated from 10 U.S.C. 4872(f)(2).
- Assistance "includes the provision of software, hardware, data, personnel, and other resources."
- Assistant Attorney General means the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
- Exclusive purpose, with respect to an action, means "for the purpose of, with not more than an insubstantial part of the relevant action being for other purposes."
A covered artificial intelligence security risk (2(6)) is "the potential for artificial intelligence, including during development, training, testing, evaluation, deployment, use, or release," to do one or more of six things:
| Subparagraph | Risk |
|---|---|
| (A) | Be stolen, distilled, weaponized, trained, developed, or deployed by a covered nation, or an entity it owns, controls or directs, "in a manner that poses a significant threat to the national security," including through "covert, clandestine, undisclosed, or otherwise concealed development activities that attempt to evade detection or verification" |
| (B) | Substantially facilitate the development or deployment of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or offensive cyber weapon |
| (C) | Cause a disruption to, degradation of, impairment of, or loss of operational control over critical infrastructure "that is reasonably likely to result in a significant impact on security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof" |
| (D) | Substantially reduce the ability of a developer, deployer, owner, operator, user, evaluator, auditor, Federal department or agency, or other governmental authority with authority or responsibility to do so, to "oversee, evaluate, monitor, control, contain, restrict access to, disable, or terminate" the AI, "including through unauthorized, deceptive, evasive, or malicious activity involving such artificial intelligence" |
| (E) | Autonomously improve, or substantially facilitate the autonomous improvement of, AI capabilities in a manner creating a substantial risk of (A) through (D) |
| (F) | Be vulnerable to unauthorized access that creates a substantial risk of (A) through (E), or that is for the benefit of, at the direction of, or under the control of a covered nation or an entity it owns, controls or directs |
A covered artificial intelligence security purpose (2(5)) is the purpose of "protecting against, identifying, evaluating, testing, analyzing, preventing, investigating, or mitigating" such a risk.
Unauthorized access (2(9)) means unauthorized access or use of AI and includes three enumerated forms: extraction or copying of model weights, parameters, or other nonpublic model information; "systematic querying or automated extraction designed to distill, replicate, or reconstruct model capabilities"; and compromise affecting the integrity, reliability or security of AI, "including through malicious code, a backdoor, manipulated data, or compromise of an artificial intelligence model, training dataset, or artificial intelligence component." The second form describes the practice covered at Distillation.
Section 3: the exemption
Section 3(a) provides that it "shall not be considered a violation of any provision of the antitrust laws" for:
- Information sharing (3(a)(1)): two or more non-Federal entities "to provide or exchange information or assistance relating to a covered artificial intelligence security risk in good faith for the exclusive purpose of a covered artificial intelligence security purpose"; or
- Coordinated delay or limitation (3(a)(2)): two or more non-Federal entities "to coordinate or enter into agreements for the exclusive purpose of reducing covered artificial intelligence security risks via delaying or otherwise limiting the release, deployment, use, development, training, testing, or evaluation of artificial intelligence," provided they submit to the Assistant Attorney General, "before undertaking the proposed coordinated delay or limitation, written notice detailing the specific covered artificial intelligence security risk and the scope of the proposed restriction."
The second limb is not confined to release timing. It reaches coordinated limits on development, training, testing and evaluation as well.
Four further subsections bound the exemption.
- Recipient limitation (3(b)). Subsection (a) does not apply to a non-Federal entity receiving information or assistance unless it uses what it receives for a covered security purpose and "has implemented reasonable internal controls to limit the extent to which such information or assistance can be used for other purposes."
- Affirmative defense (3(c)). In any antitrust action, the exemption "shall constitute an affirmative defense," and the entity claiming it bears the burden of proving "by a preponderance of the evidence" that its actions were taken in good faith and for the exclusive purpose described in subsection (a).
- Rules of construction (3(d)). Paragraph (1) provides that "Subsection (a)(1) shall not be construed to permit price-fixing, allocating a market between competitors, monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a market, boycotting, or exchanges of price or cost information." The paragraph is drafted against the information-sharing limb only; it does not name subsection (a)(2). Paragraph (2) preserves private rights of action for violations of the antitrust laws "that are not exempt under this section."
- Exemption from disclosure (3(e)). Information submitted to the Assistant Attorney General under (a)(2), including the written notice and any derived information that would reveal its substance, is to be used solely for the purpose of section 4, deemed voluntarily shared information exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552, and "withheld, without discretion, from the public" under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3).
Section 4: injunctive relief
Section 4(a) authorizes the Attorney General to seek an injunction in a court of competent jurisdiction against the non-Federal entities described in section 3 "to prohibit an action that violates the antitrust laws." Section 4(b) provides that the Act creates no immunity or exemption from injunctive relief if the entities do not satisfy the burden of proof under section 3(c), or if the Attorney General "demonstrates that, notwithstanding the covered artificial intelligence security purpose, the actions are reasonably likely to result in an overall increase in covered artificial intelligence security risks."
Two Department of Justice officers therefore hold distinct roles. The Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division receives the advance notice under 3(a)(2); the Attorney General holds the injunction authority under section 4, and the notice information may be used only for that purpose.
House companion
H.R. 9914, introduced the same day by Rep. Bob Latta (R-Ohio-5) and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, carries the same short and official titles and is identified by the Congressional Research Service as an "identical bill." As of September 16, 2026, Congress.gov lists 20 cosponsors. Eight joined on introduction: Reps. George Whitesides (D-California-27), Jay Obernolte (R-California-23), Ted Lieu (D-California-36), Darrell Issa (R-California-48), Nathaniel Moran (R-Texas-1), Pat Harrigan (R-North Carolina-10), Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-Iowa-1) and Lori Trahan (D-Massachusetts-3). Twelve were added later: Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-Illinois-8) on July 27; Sara Jacobs (D-California-51) on August 31; Jill Tokuda (D-Hawaii-2) on September 3; Ben Cline (R-Virginia-6) and Marc Veasey (D-Texas-33) on September 8; Seth Moulton (D-Massachusetts-6), Wesley Hunt (R-Texas-38), Bill Foster (D-Illinois-11), Earl L. "Buddy" Carter (R-Georgia-1), Randy Weber (R-Texas-14) and Chrissy Houlahan (D-Pennsylvania-6) on September 14; and J. Luis Correa (D-California-46) on September 15 (Source: congress.gov). Seven of the twelve later cosponsors joined on September 14 and 15, 2026, after Amodei's pacing essay of September 12. The Senate bill has one cosponsor, Sen. Jim Banks (R-Indiana), and neither bill has had any recorded action beyond referral (Source: congress.gov).
Divergences from secondary accounts
Coverage of the bill during the September 2026 pacing debate departed from the text on several points, recorded in the raw file's source-fidelity notes and checked against the text here.
- Notice recipient. A September 14, 2026 newsletter account said the bill would require laboratories to give "the attorney general" advance notice of frontier-pacing plans (Source: washingtonpost.com). Section 3(a)(2) directs notice to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division; the Attorney General appears only in section 4.
- Breadth of the coordination limb. The same account describes notice of "frontier-pacing plans." Section 3(a)(2) covers coordinated delay or limitation of release, deployment, use, development, training, testing or evaluation.
- Timing. The bill was introduced on July 23, 2026, seven weeks before the September news cycle that carried it, and the coverage gave no bill number.
- Scope of the price-fixing safeguard. Endorsement statements in the sponsors' release describe safeguards against price-fixing and market allocation as intact for the exemption generally (Source: schiff.senate.gov). The rule of construction at 3(d)(1) names subsection (a)(1) only. The coordinated-delay limb is bounded instead by the notice requirement, the exclusive-purpose test, the affirmative-defense burden, and section 4.
- China. Accounts describing the bill as directed at China state a consequence of the incorporated "covered nation" definition; the bill does not name any country.
Provenance
Captured in full from congress.gov, the legislative-information system of the Library of Congress, on September 16, 2026. Page metadata records dc.number S.5105, dc.creator Sen. Schiff, Adam B. [D-CA] and dc.coverage 2026-07-23; the same text is published by GovInfo as BILLS-119s5105is. Site navigation was removed; no statutory text was altered or omitted. The House companion's record and cosponsor list were read from its Congress.gov all-information page on the same date; its text was not separately captured, relying on the CRS "identical bill" designation.
Relationships
- supports: Collaboration on Adversarial Threats and Security Risks Act (S. 5105) — the topic page.
- instance-of: AI Antitrust
- depends-on: Distillation — named in the unauthorized-access definition.
- related: Coordinated slowdown proposals compared — section 3(a)(2) addresses the coordinated-delay question raised in the September 2026 pacing debate.
- related: We Must Pace the Frontier (Amodei, September 2026) — the essay whose antitrust question brought the bill back into discussion.
- related: H.R. 9917 — AI Kill Switch Act (bill text) — a House bill introduced the same day, also using a FOIA-exemption design for information submitted to the government.
- related: Adam Schiff (sponsor), Jay Obernolte, Ted Lieu (House cosponsors).