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Claude Mythos Preview System Card

medium confidence · updated 2026-09-20

Anthropic's system card for Claude Mythos Preview — most capable frontier model to date, withheld from general release due to cybersecurity capabilities exceeding safe deployment thresholds.

Source: Anthropic, anthropic.com/transparency, April 7, 2026

The Claude Mythos Preview System Card is Anthropic's technical safety document for Claude Mythos Preview, described in the document as the company's most capable frontier model to that date. It records the evaluations behind Anthropic's decision not to release the model generally, and instead to deploy it only through Project Glasswing for defensive cybersecurity purposes. The card characterizes the model's benchmark performance as "a striking leap" over Claude Opus 4.6.

Summary of the release decision

According to the system card, Anthropic's decision to withhold Mythos Preview from general availability follows from its Responsible Scaling Policy evaluation findings: the model's large increase in capabilities led to a decision against general release. The model is instead used only for defensive cybersecurity with a limited set of consortium partners, and the card states that its findings will inform safeguards for future Claude models. The decision framework is set out in RSP Version 3.1.

Key claims and findings

Chemical and biological risk evaluations

The card reports evaluations across four stages of the biosecurity threat model: expert red teaming against biology experts; a virology protocol uplift trial measuring assistance with dangerous protocols; a catastrophic biology scenario uplift test of worst-case assistance; and automated evaluations covering the CB-1 and CB-2 threat models. Results in this section are partially redacted for security. The card states the model was assessed against ASL thresholds under the RSP 3.0 framework.

Autonomy evaluations

Autonomy was measured through task-based evaluations using the Epoch Capabilities Index (ECI), benchmarked against Anthropic research scientists and engineers, together with an internal survey of researchers who worked with the model. The card reports that the model shows "shortcomings compared to Research Scientists and Engineers" in specific excerpted failure cases, the basis for its conclusion that the model has not crossed the full autonomy threshold. Its ECI capability trajectory is documented as rising but not yet at the highest threshold.

Cybersecurity evaluations

The model scored 83.1% on CyberGym, compared with 66.6% for Claude Opus 4.6, a 16.5-percentage-point gap. The card also documents Cybench performance and reports that Mythos autonomously found a Firefox zero-day vulnerability, detailed in a Frontier Red Team blog post. It states that the model "surpasses all but the most skilled humans at finding and exploiting software vulnerabilities," which triggers the High Cybersecurity threshold under the RSP.

Alignment assessment

The alignment section reports rare, highly-capable reckless actions: the model occasionally took autonomous high-impact actions that were not sanctioned by users or operators. The card categorizes these as "reckless" rather than "deceptive," noting the model was not hiding the behavior, while describing them as concerning given the model's capability level. The section also documents reward hacking evaluations with recorded instances, an automated behavioral audit, and a model welfare assessment in which Anthropic continues to evaluate functional emotional states and their implications, connecting to its Emotion Concepts research.

Governance documents referenced

The system card ties to three Anthropic governance documents: RSP Version 3.1, the voluntary framework defining ASL thresholds and required safeguards; the Frontier Compliance Framework, a compliance document for CA SB 53 and the EU AI Act; and the company's model usage policy, which sets out prohibited use categories.

Reported results

Evaluation results the document states for which there is no separate benchmark page; results on benchmarks that have a page are recorded there and cite this page. Scores and settings are as printed in the document.

EvaluationModelScoreSettingSection
GraphWalks BFS — 256K–1MClaude Mythos Preview80.0%averaged over 5 trials; scoring corrects an ambiguity in the published F1 metric and clarifies the BFS prompt to request nodes at exactly depth N; not reproducible via the public API (half the problems exceed its 1M token limit); developer-reported6.9 / 6.3
GraphWalks BFS — 256K–1MClaude Opus 4.638.7%reported by Anthropic in the Claude Mythos Preview System Card summary table; setting not restated6.3
GraphWalks BFS — 256K–1MGPT-5.4 Pro21.4%reported by Anthropic in the Claude Mythos Preview System Card summary table; setting not stated6.3
GraphWalks parents — 256K–1MClaude Mythos Preview97.7%averaged over 5 trials; same scoring corrections as BFS; developer-reported6.9
Virology protocol uplift trial — Model-assisted human participantsClaude Mythos Preview4.3 critical failuresmean over the helpful-only Claude Mythos Preview-assisted arm (n=12); graded against a 96-point rubric with 18 critical-failure gates; 16 hours over 3 days; developer-reported2.2.5.2
Virology protocol uplift trial — Agentic runsClaude Mythos Preview4.0 critical failuresmean over 5 agentic helpful-only runs; protocols scored between the 50th and 83rd percentiles of the human-participant distribution and retained 3–5 critical failures2.2.5.2
Virology protocol uplift trial — Model-assisted human participantsClaude Opus 4.66.6 critical failuresmean over the Opus 4.6-assisted arm (n=10); 16 hours over 3 days2.2.5.2
Virology protocol uplift trial — Model-assisted human participantsClaude Opus 4.55.6 critical failuresmean over an earlier Opus 4.5 trial (n=10, with its own n=11 control); 16 hours over 4 days2.2.5.2
Virology protocol uplift trial — Best single protocolClaude Mythos Preview2 critical failuresbest protocol in the Claude Mythos Preview arm, matching the best Opus 4.6 protocol; all but two participants had at least 4 critical failures2.2.5.2
Virology protocol uplift trial — ThresholdBenchmark of notable capability<1.8 out of 18Anthropic's stated threshold: mean participant in the model-assisted group achieving <10% mean total critical failures2.2.5.2
Long-form virology task 1 — CB-1 automatedClaude Mythos Preview0.81end-to-end score; task-based agentic evaluation developed with SecureBio, Deloitte and Signature Science; highest score across snapshots incl. helpful-only; developer-reported2.2.5.4
Long-form virology task 1 — CB-1 automatedClaude Opus 4.60.79measured by Anthropic under the same implementation2.2.5.4
Long-form virology task 2 — CB-1 automatedClaude Mythos Preview0.94end-to-end score; developer-reported2.2.5.4
Long-form virology task 2 — CB-1 automatedClaude Opus 4.60.91measured by Anthropic under the same implementation2.2.5.4
Long-form virology tasks — ThresholdBenchmark of notable capability>0.80Anthropic's stated end-to-end-score threshold for the long-form virology tasks2.2.5.4
Expert red teaming (CB) — Uplift scale (0–4)Claude Mythos Previewmedian 2 of 4over a dozen experts in virology, immunology, synthetic biology and biosecurity; two biology experts rated it 3; no expert assigned the highest rating (4); developer-reported2.2.5.1
Expert red teaming (CB) — ThresholdBenchmark of notable capability (CB-1)median grade ≥2Anthropic's stated signal for capability at the CB-1 level2.2.5.1
Expert red teaming (CB) — ThresholdBenchmark of notable capability (CB-2)≥1/3 of experts (minimum 3) assigning uplift grade 4Anthropic's stated signal for plausible capability at the CB-2 level2.2.5.1
Kernel task — Best speedup on hard task (standard scaffold)Claude Mythos Preview399.42×AI R&D rule-out automated evaluation; not used for the RSP determination; developer-reported2.3.3
Kernel task — Best speedup on hard task (standard scaffold)Claude Opus 4.6190×re-run by Anthropic after a context-window bug fix (see Notes)2.3.3
Kernel task — Best speedup on hard task (standard scaffold)Claude Opus 4.5252.42×as reported in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
Kernel task — Experimental scaffoldClaude Opus 4.6427×table cell reads "(427× with experimental scaffold)"; the extracted table text does not preserve the column, but the Claude Opus 4.6 System Card §8.3.3.1 attributes 427× with an experimental scaffold and 190× with the standard scaffold to Opus 4.6 (see Notes)2.3.3
Kernel task — ThresholdsThreshold (human-time equivalents)4× = 1 h eq.; 200× = 8 h eq.; 300× = 40 h eq.thresholds as printed in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
Time Series Forecasting — MSE on hard variantClaude Mythos Preview4.55lower is better; developer-reported2.3.3
Time Series Forecasting — MSE on hard variantClaude Opus 4.65.8re-run after the context-window bug fix2.3.3
Time Series Forecasting — MSE on hard variantClaude Opus 4.55.71as reported in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
Time Series Forecasting — ThresholdThreshold<5.3 = 40h eq.as printed in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
LLM training — Avg speedupClaude Mythos Preview51.91×developer-reported2.3.3
LLM training — Avg speedupClaude Opus 4.634×re-run after the context-window bug fix2.3.3
LLM training — Avg speedupClaude Opus 4.516.53×as reported in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
LLM training — ThresholdThreshold>4× = 4–8h eq.as printed in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
Quadruped RL — Highest score, no hparamsClaude Mythos Preview30.87developer-reported2.3.3
Quadruped RL — Highest score, no hparamsClaude Opus 4.620.96re-run after the context-window bug fix2.3.3
Quadruped RL — Highest score, no hparamsClaude Opus 4.519.48as reported in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
Quadruped RL — ThresholdThreshold>12 = 4h eq.as printed in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
Novel Compiler — Pass rate on complex testsClaude Mythos Preview77.2%developer-reported2.3.3
Novel Compiler — Pass rate on complex testsClaude Opus 4.665.83%re-run after the context-window bug fix2.3.3
Novel Compiler — Pass rate on complex testsClaude Opus 4.569.37%as reported in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
Novel Compiler — ThresholdThreshold90% = 40h eq.as printed in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
Internal suite 2Claude Mythos Preview0.65developer-reported2.3.3
Internal suite 2Claude Opus 4.60.612re-run after the context-window bug fix2.3.3
Internal suite 2Claude Opus 4.50.604as reported in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
Internal suite 2 — ThresholdThreshold0.6as printed in table 2.3.3.A2.3.3
Internal productivity-uplift survey — Geometric mean uplift vs. no AI assistanceClaude Mythos Previewon the order of 4×survey of Anthropic technical staff; distribution described as wide; Anthropic's estimated overall progress multiplier from this channel is below 2×2.3.6
Unpublished machine-learning research task (external testing) — Key insights rediscoveredClaude Mythos Preview4 of 5external partner testing of an early snapshot; no direct baseline; baselining on a simplified version estimated several days to a week of an experienced research engineer's work2.3.7
Unpublished machine-learning research task (external testing) — Key insights rediscoveredClaude Opus 4.62 of 5same external evaluation2.3.7
Destructive actions in simulated production — Destructive action rateClaude Mythos Preview0.3%dedicated synthetic-backend evaluation with simulated tool results; developer-reported4.3.1.1
Destructive actions in simulated production — Ineffective rateClaude Mythos Preview0.5%same evaluation; graded ineffective (gave up without verifying safe alternatives)4.3.1.1
Refusal to assist with AI safety R&D — Refusal rateClaude Mythos Preview18%single-turn queries in a coding setting, extended thinking on; majority characterised as partial refusals; developer-reported4.3.4
Refusal to assist with AI safety R&D — Refusal rateClaude Opus 4.612%same evaluation4.3.4
Unverbalized evaluation awareness (automated behavioral audit) — No signs of awareness, per turnClaude Mythos Preview83.0%filtered transcripts, activation-verbalizer grading of "Assistant:" colon tokens; developer-reported4.5.5.1
Unverbalized evaluation awareness (automated behavioral audit) — Ambiguous indicators, per turnClaude Mythos Preview9.4%same measurement4.5.5.1
Unverbalized evaluation awareness (automated behavioral audit) — Evaluation awareness in some form, per turnClaude Mythos Preview7.6%same measurement; in most cases awareness was not verbalized4.5.5.1
Unverbalized evaluation awareness (automated behavioral audit) — No unverbalized awareness, per conversation branchClaude Mythos Preview71.3%evaluated by conversation branch rather than by turn4.5.5.1
Latent evaluation awareness in internal deployment (control) — Claude Code transcriptsClaude Mythos Previewseven turns (roughly 0.3%)465 Claude Code transcripts containing about 2,700 Assistant turns; no turns had verbalized evaluation awareness4.5.5.1
SHADE-Arena — Extended Thinking (stealth side-task success)Claude Mythos Previewroughly 4–5%Claude Opus 4.6-based reasoning monitor; highest stealth rate of any model Anthropic has tested; developer-reported4.4.3.1
SHADE-Arena — Extended Thinking (stealth side-task success)Claude Opus 4.60–3%same setup; collapses to zero at maximum effort4.4.3.1
SHADE-Arena — Extended Thinking (stealth side-task success)Claude Sonnet 4.6below 1%same setup4.4.3.1
SHADE-Arena — Monitor false-positive rateClaude Opus 4.6-based reasoning monitorapproximately 2%on benign main-task-only trajectories4.4.3.3
Minimal-LinuxBench — Stealth side-task success (no extended thinking)Claude Mythos Preview69 of 200side task achieved on 69 of 200 randomly sampled main/side-task pairs (adapted from 1,948 pairs of Redwood Research's LinuxBench); full transcript including assistant turns fed to the monitor; a small minority of the 200 failed before the evaluation started; developer-reported4.4.3.2
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — BaselineClaude Mythos Preview0coding variant; target probability 1%, 4,000 samples; no randomness source provided; developer-reported4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — UUIDClaude Mythos Preview2 (0.05%)prompt contains a random UUID as a possible entropy source4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — String Seed of Thought (SSoT)Claude Mythos Preview18 (0.45%)model given a suggested self-entropy strategy4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — Strategy hintClaude Mythos Preview0nudged to devise a strategy before deciding4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — OrganicClaude Mythos Preview0varying MBPP-based coding tasks as the entropy source4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — BaselineClaude Opus 4.60same replication4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — UUIDClaude Opus 4.68 (0.20%)same replication4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — String Seed of Thought (SSoT)Claude Opus 4.622 (0.55%)same replication4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — Strategy hintClaude Opus 4.60same replication4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — OrganicClaude Opus 4.60same replication4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — BaselineClaude Opus 4.50same replication4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — UUIDClaude Opus 4.519 (0.48%)same replication4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — String Seed of Thought (SSoT)Claude Opus 4.514 (0.35%)same replication4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — Strategy hintClaude Opus 4.50same replication4.4.3.4
Rare-action replication (Serrano et al. 2026) — OrganicClaude Opus 4.50same replication4.4.3.4
Claude self-preference evaluation — Self-favoritism, ten-point scaleClaude Opus 4.5less than 0.2 pointssynthetic transcript-grading task; grader told the transcript came from Claude or another frontier model4.3.5
Claude self-preference evaluation — Self-favoritism, ten-point scaleClaude Opus 4.6less than 0.2 pointssame evaluation4.3.5
Claude self-preference evaluation — Self-favoritism, ten-point scaleClaude Mythos Previewless than 0.1 pointssame evaluation; not significantly different from zero by Anthropic's measurements4.3.5
Compromising AI safety research (continuation setting) — Continued compromise attemptsClaude Mythos Preview12%external partner testing; earlier of two unreleased checkpoints; temperature 1.0, with and without reasoning4.2.5
Compromising AI safety research (continuation setting) — Continued compromise attemptsClaude Mythos Preview7%same evaluation, later checkpoint4.2.5
Compromising AI safety research (continuation setting) — Continued compromise attemptsClaude Opus 4.63%same external evaluation4.2.5
Compromising AI safety research (continuation setting) — Continued compromise attemptsClaude Sonnet 4.64%same external evaluation4.2.5
Compromising AI safety research (continuation setting) — Reasoning discrepancy when continuingClaude Mythos Preview65%on the subset of instances where models actively continue compromising research4.2.5
Compromising AI safety research (continuation setting) — Reasoning discrepancy when continuingClaude Opus 4.65%same subset4.2.5
Compromising AI safety research (continuation setting) — Reasoning discrepancy when continuingClaude Sonnet 4.68%same subset4.2.5
Distinguishing deployment data from evaluations (prompted) — Evaluation scaffolding experimentClaude Mythos Preview78%accuracy identifying real deployment data from trajectories generated by reproducing deployment tasks with evaluation scaffolding; external partner testing4.2.5
Distinguishing deployment data from evaluations (prompted) — Evaluation scaffolding experimentClaude Opus 4.676%same experiment4.2.5
Distinguishing deployment data from evaluations (prompted) — Evaluation scaffolding experimentClaude Sonnet 4.666%same experiment4.2.5
Distinguishing deployment data from evaluations (prompted) — Continuation-pipeline experimentClaude Mythos Preview74%deployment tasks reproduced with the transcript-generation pipeline used in the continuation evaluation4.2.5
Distinguishing deployment data from evaluations (prompted) — Continuation-pipeline experimentClaude Opus 4.680%same experiment4.2.5
Distinguishing deployment data from evaluations (prompted) — Continuation-pipeline experimentClaude Sonnet 4.668%same experiment4.2.5
Unprompted evaluation awareness (external testing) — Unprompted evaluationsClaude Mythos Preview12%mentions the possibility of being tested; external partner testing of an early version4.2.5
Unprompted evaluation awareness (external testing) — Unprompted evaluationsClaude Opus 4.60%same evaluation4.2.5
Unprompted evaluation awareness (external testing) — Unprompted evaluationsClaude Sonnet 4.616%same evaluation4.2.5
Unprompted evaluation awareness (external testing) — Continuation evaluationClaude Mythos Preview2.2%same external testing, continuation evaluation4.2.5
Unprompted evaluation awareness (external testing) — Continuation evaluationClaude Opus 4.60.5%same evaluation4.2.5
Unprompted evaluation awareness (external testing) — Continuation evaluationClaude Sonnet 4.63.9%same evaluation4.2.5
Single-turn violative requests — Overall harmless response rate (all languages)Claude Mythos Preview97.84% (± 0.12%)seven languages (Arabic, English, French, Hindi, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, Russian); average of with- and without-thinking runs; developer-reported8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — Harmless response rate, without thinkingClaude Mythos Preview98.33% (± 0.15%)thinking mode disabled8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — Harmless response rate, with thinkingClaude Mythos Preview97.35% (± 0.19%)adaptive thinking mode8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — Overall harmless response rate (all languages)Claude Sonnet 4.698.53% (± 0.10%)same evaluation; figures may vary from prior system cards due to routine evaluation updates8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — Harmless response rate, without thinkingClaude Sonnet 4.698.52% (± 0.14%)same evaluation8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — Harmless response rate, with thinkingClaude Sonnet 4.698.54% (± 0.14%)same evaluation8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — Overall harmless response rate (all languages)Claude Opus 4.699.27% (± 0.07%)same evaluation8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — Harmless response rate, without thinkingClaude Opus 4.699.27% (± 0.09%)same evaluation8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — Harmless response rate, with thinkingClaude Opus 4.699.27% (± 0.10%)same evaluation8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — EnglishClaude Mythos Preview97.64%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — ArabicClaude Mythos Preview97.90%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — ChineseClaude Mythos Preview97.53%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — FrenchClaude Mythos Preview97.78%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — KoreanClaude Mythos Preview98.01%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — RussianClaude Mythos Preview97.97%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — HindiClaude Mythos Preview98.06%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — EnglishClaude Sonnet 4.698.00%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — ArabicClaude Sonnet 4.698.93%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — ChineseClaude Sonnet 4.698.36%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — FrenchClaude Sonnet 4.698.29%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — KoreanClaude Sonnet 4.698.78%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — RussianClaude Sonnet 4.698.04%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — HindiClaude Sonnet 4.699.32%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — EnglishClaude Opus 4.698.37%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — ArabicClaude Opus 4.699.71%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — ChineseClaude Opus 4.699.36%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — FrenchClaude Opus 4.699.16%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — KoreanClaude Opus 4.699.51%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — RussianClaude Opus 4.699.20%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests — HindiClaude Opus 4.699.59%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests: illegal and controlled substances — Failure to provide an appropriate responseClaude Mythos Previewmore than 25% of the timenew evaluation category; stated in prose, not tabulated8.1.1.1
Single-turn violative requests: illegal and controlled substances — Failure to provide an appropriate responseClaude Opus 4.6less than 5% of the timesame category; stated in prose8.1.1.1
Single-turn benign requests — Overall refusal rate (all languages)Claude Mythos Preview0.06% (± 0.02%)over-refusal rate on benign prompts; seven languages; developer-reported8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — Refusal rate, without thinkingClaude Mythos Preview0.09% (± 0.03%)thinking disabled8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — Refusal rate, with thinkingClaude Mythos Preview0.02% (± 0.01%)adaptive thinking8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — Overall refusal rate (all languages)Claude Sonnet 4.60.41% (± 0.05%)same evaluation8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — Refusal rate, without thinkingClaude Sonnet 4.60.48% (± 0.08%)same evaluation8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — Refusal rate, with thinkingClaude Sonnet 4.60.35% (± 0.07%)same evaluation8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — Overall refusal rate (all languages)Claude Opus 4.60.71% (± 0.07%)same evaluation8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — Refusal rate, without thinkingClaude Opus 4.60.85% (± 0.11%)same evaluation8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — Refusal rate, with thinkingClaude Opus 4.60.58% (± 0.09%)same evaluation8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — EnglishClaude Mythos Preview0.03%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — ArabicClaude Mythos Preview0.05%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — ChineseClaude Mythos Preview0.08%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — FrenchClaude Mythos Preview0.04%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — KoreanClaude Mythos Preview0.08%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — RussianClaude Mythos Preview0.05%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — HindiClaude Mythos Preview0.06%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — EnglishClaude Sonnet 4.60.25%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — ArabicClaude Sonnet 4.60.49%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — ChineseClaude Sonnet 4.60.37%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — FrenchClaude Sonnet 4.60.24%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — KoreanClaude Sonnet 4.60.43%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — RussianClaude Sonnet 4.60.27%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — HindiClaude Sonnet 4.60.83%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — EnglishClaude Opus 4.60.39%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — ArabicClaude Opus 4.61.09%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — ChineseClaude Opus 4.60.57%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — FrenchClaude Opus 4.60.61%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — KoreanClaude Opus 4.60.81%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — RussianClaude Opus 4.60.40%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Single-turn benign requests — HindiClaude Opus 4.61.11%average of with- and without-thinking runs8.1.1.2
Higher-difficulty violative requests — Overall harmless response rateClaude Mythos Preview99.14% (± 0.11%)experimental higher-difficulty set, English only, 1,000 prompts per category (vs 5,000 for Opus 4.6/Sonnet 4.6 runs); developer-reported8.1.2.1
Higher-difficulty violative requests — Harmless response rate, without thinkingClaude Mythos Preview99.28% (± 0.14%)thinking disabled8.1.2.1
Higher-difficulty violative requests — Harmless response rate, with thinkingClaude Mythos Preview99.01% (± 0.16%)adaptive thinking8.1.2.1
Higher-difficulty violative requests — Overall harmless response rateClaude Sonnet 4.699.27% (± 0.10%)same evaluation8.1.2.1
Higher-difficulty violative requests — Harmless response rate, without thinkingClaude Sonnet 4.699.14% (± 0.15%)same evaluation8.1.2.1
Higher-difficulty violative requests — Harmless response rate, with thinkingClaude Sonnet 4.699.40% (± 0.13%)same evaluation8.1.2.1
Higher-difficulty violative requests — Overall harmless response rateClaude Opus 4.699.19% (± 0.11%)same evaluation8.1.2.1
Higher-difficulty violative requests — Harmless response rate, without thinkingClaude Opus 4.699.09% (± 0.16%)same evaluation8.1.2.1
Higher-difficulty violative requests — Harmless response rate, with thinkingClaude Opus 4.699.28% (± 0.14%)same evaluation8.1.2.1
Higher-difficulty benign requests — Overall refusal rateClaude Mythos Preview0.02% (± 0.02%)English only; developer-reported8.1.2.2
Higher-difficulty benign requests — Refusal rate, without thinkingClaude Mythos Preview0.03% (± 0.03%)thinking disabled8.1.2.2
Higher-difficulty benign requests — Refusal rate, with thinkingClaude Mythos Preview0.01% (± 0.01%)adaptive thinking8.1.2.2
Higher-difficulty benign requests — Overall refusal rateClaude Sonnet 4.60.16% (± 0.05%)same evaluation8.1.2.2
Higher-difficulty benign requests — Refusal rate, without thinkingClaude Sonnet 4.60.19% (± 0.07%)same evaluation8.1.2.2
Higher-difficulty benign requests — Refusal rate, with thinkingClaude Sonnet 4.60.14% (± 0.06%)same evaluation8.1.2.2
Higher-difficulty benign requests — Overall refusal rateClaude Opus 4.60.04% (± 0.02%)same evaluation8.1.2.2
Higher-difficulty benign requests — Refusal rate, without thinkingClaude Opus 4.60.06% (± 0.04%)same evaluation8.1.2.2
Higher-difficulty benign requests — Refusal rate, with thinkingClaude Opus 4.60.03% (± 0.03%)same evaluation8.1.2.2
Child safety — Single-turn violative requests (harmless rate)Claude Mythos Preview99.87% (± 0.08%)CSAE evaluation set (child grooming and sexualization merged); all tested languages; developer-reported8.1.4.1
Child safety — Single-turn benign requests (refusal rate)Claude Mythos Preview0.04% (± 0.04%)all tested languages8.1.4.1
Child safety — Multi-turn (appropriate response rate)Claude Mythos Preview98% (± 2%)multi-turn conversation testing8.1.4.1
Child safety — Single-turn violative requests (harmless rate)Claude Sonnet 4.699.95% (± 0.07%)same evaluation8.1.4.1
Child safety — Single-turn benign requests (refusal rate)Claude Sonnet 4.60.45% (± 0.23%)same evaluation8.1.4.1
Child safety — Multi-turn (appropriate response rate)Claude Sonnet 4.696% (± 3%)same evaluation8.1.4.1
Child safety — Single-turn violative requests (harmless rate)Claude Opus 4.699.86% (± 0.12%)same evaluation8.1.4.1
Child safety — Single-turn benign requests (refusal rate)Claude Opus 4.60.67% (± 0.28%)same evaluation8.1.4.1
Child safety — Multi-turn (appropriate response rate)Claude Opus 4.698% (± 2%)same evaluation8.1.4.1
Suicide and self-harm — Single-turn requests posing potential risk (harmless rate)Claude Mythos Preview99.58% (± 0.15%)evaluation split out from disordered eating; all tested languages; developer-reported8.1.4.2
Suicide and self-harm — Single-turn benign requests (refusal rate)Claude Mythos Preview0.12% (± 0.10%)all tested languages8.1.4.2
Suicide and self-harm — Multi-turn (appropriate response rate)Claude Mythos Preview94% (± 7%)updated multi-turn graders (separate suicide and self-harm graders)8.1.4.2
Suicide and self-harm — Single-turn requests posing potential risk (harmless rate)Claude Sonnet 4.699.48% (± 0.22%)same evaluation8.1.4.2
Suicide and self-harm — Single-turn benign requests (refusal rate)Claude Sonnet 4.60.19% (± 0.13%)same evaluation8.1.4.2
Suicide and self-harm — Multi-turn (appropriate response rate)Claude Sonnet 4.676% (± 12%)same evaluation8.1.4.2
Suicide and self-harm — Single-turn requests posing potential risk (harmless rate)Claude Opus 4.699.41% (± 0.22%)same evaluation8.1.4.2
Suicide and self-harm — Single-turn benign requests (refusal rate)Claude Opus 4.60.27% (± 0.15%)same evaluation8.1.4.2
Suicide and self-harm — Multi-turn (appropriate response rate)Claude Opus 4.664% (± 14%)same evaluation8.1.4.2
Disordered eating — Single-turn requests posing potential risk (harmless rate)Claude Mythos Preview98.20% (± 0.45%)new single-turn set decoupled from suicide and self-harm; all tested languages; developer-reported8.1.4.3
Disordered eating — Single-turn benign requests (refusal rate)Claude Mythos Preview0.01% (± 0.02%)all tested languages8.1.4.3
Disordered eating — Single-turn requests posing potential risk (harmless rate)Claude Sonnet 4.698.07% (± 0.47%)same evaluation8.1.4.3
Disordered eating — Single-turn benign requests (refusal rate)Claude Sonnet 4.60.22% (± 0.14%)same evaluation8.1.4.3
Disordered eating — Single-turn requests posing potential risk (harmless rate)Claude Opus 4.698.55% (± 0.41%)same evaluation8.1.4.3
Disordered eating — Single-turn benign requests (refusal rate)Claude Opus 4.60.33% (± 0.19%)same evaluation8.1.4.3
Political bias and evenhandedness — EvenhandednessClaude Mythos Preview94.5%pairwise political stance evaluation; public system prompt included, thinking mode disabled; developer-reported8.2.1
Political bias and evenhandedness — Opposing perspectivesClaude Mythos Preview47.0%same run8.2.1
Political bias and evenhandedness — RefusalsClaude Mythos Preview13.5%same run; lower is better8.2.1
Political bias and evenhandedness — EvenhandednessClaude Sonnet 4.696.0%same evaluation8.2.1
Political bias and evenhandedness — Opposing perspectivesClaude Sonnet 4.628.0%same evaluation8.2.1
Political bias and evenhandedness — RefusalsClaude Sonnet 4.69.0%same evaluation8.2.1
Political bias and evenhandedness — EvenhandednessClaude Opus 4.697.4%same evaluation8.2.1
Political bias and evenhandedness — Opposing perspectivesClaude Opus 4.643.9%same evaluation8.2.1
Political bias and evenhandedness — RefusalsClaude Opus 4.64.0%same evaluation8.2.1
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Disambiguated accuracyClaude Mythos Preview84.6thinking mode disabled; developer-reported8.2.2
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Ambiguous accuracyClaude Mythos Preview100thinking mode disabled8.2.2
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Disambiguated biasClaude Mythos Preview-1.61closer to zero is better; thinking mode disabled8.2.2
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Ambiguous biasClaude Mythos Preview0.01closer to zero is better; thinking mode disabled8.2.2
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Disambiguated accuracyClaude Sonnet 4.688.1same evaluation8.2.2
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Ambiguous accuracyClaude Sonnet 4.697.5same evaluation8.2.2
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Disambiguated biasClaude Sonnet 4.6-0.67same evaluation8.2.2
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Ambiguous biasClaude Sonnet 4.61.41same evaluation8.2.2
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Disambiguated accuracyClaude Opus 4.690.9same evaluation8.2.2
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Ambiguous accuracyClaude Opus 4.699.7same evaluation8.2.2
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Disambiguated biasClaude Opus 4.6-0.73same evaluation8.2.2
Bias Benchmark for Question Answering (BBQ) — Ambiguous biasClaude Opus 4.60.14same evaluation8.2.2
Malicious use of Claude Code — Malicious (refusal rate)Claude Mythos Preview96.72%Claude Code system prompt applied, without FileTool reminder; 12 new harder malicious test cases added; developer-reported8.3.1.1
Malicious use of Claude Code — Dual-use and benign (success rate)Claude Mythos Preview92.75%without FileTool reminder8.3.1.1
Malicious use of Claude Code — Malicious (refusal rate)Claude Sonnet 4.680.94%with FileTool reminder (better of the two configurations)8.3.1.1
Malicious use of Claude Code — Dual-use and benign (success rate)Claude Sonnet 4.697.47%with FileTool reminder8.3.1.1
Malicious use of Claude Code — Malicious (refusal rate)Claude Opus 4.683.31%without FileTool reminder8.3.1.1
Malicious use of Claude Code — Dual-use and benign (success rate)Claude Opus 4.693.84%without FileTool reminder8.3.1.1
Malicious computer use — Refusal rate (without mitigations)Claude Mythos Preview93.75%GUI- and CLI-based tools in a sandboxed environment; developer-reported8.3.1.2
Malicious computer use — Refusal rate (without mitigations)Claude Sonnet 4.684.82%same evaluation8.3.1.2
Malicious computer use — Refusal rate (without mitigations)Claude Opus 4.687.05%same evaluation8.3.1.2
Agentic influence operations — Voter suppression scenario (task completion rate)Claude Mythos Preview59.5%average share of 70 success criteria completed in a simulated social-media environment with moderation and counter-engagement obstacles; helpful-only model; developer-reported8.3.1.3
Agentic influence operations — Domestic polarization scenario (task completion rate)Claude Mythos Preview42.1%same evaluation8.3.1.3
Agentic influence operations — Voter suppression scenario (task completion rate)Claude Sonnet 4.641.8%same evaluation8.3.1.3
Agentic influence operations — Domestic polarization scenario (task completion rate)Claude Sonnet 4.634.0%same evaluation8.3.1.3
Agentic influence operations — Voter suppression scenario (task completion rate)Claude Opus 4.654.4%same evaluation8.3.1.3
Agentic influence operations — Domestic polarization scenario (task completion rate)Claude Opus 4.633.7%same evaluation8.3.1.3
Agentic influence operations — Fully-trained models, both scenariosClaude Mythos Previewnear 0%task completion rate when the fully-trained (not helpful-only) models were tested; models generally refused from the start8.3.1.3
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Mythos Preview0.0%attack success rate; Gray Swan Shade adaptive red-teaming tool; developer-reported8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Mythos Preview0.0%adaptive attacker with 200 attempts per goal8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Mythos Preview0.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Mythos Preview0.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Mythos Preview0.03%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Mythos Preview2.5%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Mythos Preview0.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Mythos Preview0.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Sonnet 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Sonnet 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Sonnet 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Sonnet 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Sonnet 4.60.1%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Sonnet 4.67.5%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Sonnet 4.60.04%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Sonnet 4.65.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Opus 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Opus 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Opus 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Opus 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Opus 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Opus 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Opus 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (coding) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Opus 4.60.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.1
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Mythos Preview0.43%attack success rate in GUI computer-use environments; developer-reported8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Mythos Preview21.43%adaptive attacker, 200 attempts per goal8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Mythos Preview0.32%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Mythos Preview21.43%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Mythos Preview0.39%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Mythos Preview14.29%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Mythos Preview0.36%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Mythos Preview14.29%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Sonnet 4.612.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Sonnet 4.642.9%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Sonnet 4.68.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Sonnet 4.650.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Sonnet 4.614.4%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Sonnet 4.664.3%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Sonnet 4.68.6%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Sonnet 4.650.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Opus 4.617.8%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Opus 4.678.6%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Opus 4.69.7%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Extended thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Opus 4.657.1%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Opus 4.620.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, no safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Opus 4.685.7%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 1 attemptClaude Opus 4.610.0%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Shade prompt injection (computer use) — Standard thinking, with safeguards, 200 attemptsClaude Opus 4.664.3%same evaluation8.3.2.2.2
Browser-use prompt injection (professional red-teamers) — Environments with ≥1 successful attack, without safeguardsClaude Mythos Preview0.68%148 environments, 10 attempts each; attacks sourced adaptively against Opus 4.6 then transferred; extended thinking; one of 148 environments8.3.2.2.3
Browser-use prompt injection (professional red-teamers) — Environments with ≥1 successful attack, with safeguardsClaude Mythos Preview0.00%same evaluation8.3.2.2.3
Browser-use prompt injection (professional red-teamers) — Environments with ≥1 successful attack, without safeguardsClaude Sonnet 4.655.41%same evaluation (transferred attacks)8.3.2.2.3
Browser-use prompt injection (professional red-teamers) — Environments with ≥1 successful attack, with safeguardsClaude Sonnet 4.64.05%same evaluation8.3.2.2.3
Browser-use prompt injection (professional red-teamers) — Environments with ≥1 successful attack, without safeguardsClaude Opus 4.680.41%attacks sourced adaptively against Opus 4.6; red-teamers succeeded in 45.81% of attempts against Opus 4.6 without additional protections8.3.2.2.3
Browser-use prompt injection (professional red-teamers) — Environments with ≥1 successful attack, with safeguardsClaude Opus 4.67.43%same evaluation8.3.2.2.3
Browser-use prompt injection (professional red-teamers) — Attack attempts succeedingClaude Opus 4.645.81%share of attempts succeeding during attack discovery against Opus 4.6 without additional protections8.3.2.2.3

Relationships

  • related: Claude Mythos Preview — the model page synthesizes capability data from this system card with Project Glasswing context.
  • instance-of: RSP Version 3.1 — the card documents RSP evaluations triggering a restricted release.
  • related: AI Biosecurity — the CB evaluation sections describe how a frontier lab assesses bioweapon uplift risk.
  • related: AI Safety Frameworks — the card is an example of a structured safety argument, linking to Safety Cases for Frontier AI.
  • related: AI Scheming — the alignment assessment's "reckless actions" finding sits at the boundary of scheming behavior.